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Rule of Men
"Men often say that one cannot legislate morality. I should say
that we legislate hardly anything else."'

INTRODUCTION

The recent Kentucky Supreme Court decision, Commonwealth v.
Wasson,2 marks a new day in the role that the Kentucky Supreme Court
plays in the development of the law. Our supreme court has abandoned
the rule of law and now subscribes to a process of decision making based
solely on the justices' whims and personal opinions.3 Wasson stands for
the proposition that no matter how little authority, how little precedent,
and how little textual constitutional support exists, certain justices on the
Kentucky Supreme Court are willing to usurp the rule of law, as enacted
by Kentucky's duly elected legislators and as embodied by the framers in
the Kentucky Constitution, m order to effect any result that seems correct
to the justices despite rational and undeniable proof to the contrary.
State decisions such as Wasson will continue to take on great
inportance as the United States Supreme Court continues to, m this
author's view, return legitimacy to the United States Constitution. As a
result,the next battle over privacy and equal protection issues most likely
will take place in the state legislatures and courts. One hopes that the
state courts, including Kentucky's, will realize the gravity of their
decisions and refuse to circumvent the will of the people and the framers
of the respective state constitutions by inventing new constitutional rights
such as the right to engage m homosexual sodomy.
In Wasson, the Kentucky Supreme Court found the Kentucky statute
that prohibits homosexual sodomy unconstitutional under the Kentucky
Constitution.4 Specifically, the Kentucky Supreme Court found that the
statute violated Kentucky's constitutional right to privacy and the state's
guarantee of equal protection.5 The sodomy statute found unconstitutional

'Eugene V Rostow, The Enforcement of Morals, 1960 CAmBRmIE LJ.174, 197.
2842 S.W.2d 487 (Ky. 1992). Wasson has a somewhat confusing procedural history that is
unrelated to the constitutional issues. Ths procedural history will not be discussed.
' Ile majority opinion in Wasson was written by Justice Leibson and joined by Chief Justice
Stephens and Justices Spain and Combs. Justices Lambert, Wintershenmer, and Reynolds dissented.
'See KY. CONSr. §§ 1, 2.
'Wasson, 842 S.W.2d at 491-92.
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by the Wasson court, Kentucky Revised Statutes section 510.100,
provided:
o
SODOMY in the fourth degree.
(1) A person is guilty of Sodomy in the fourth degree when he
engages in deviate sexual intercourse with another person of the same
sex.
(2) Notwithstanding the provisions of KRS 510.020, the consent of
the other person shall not be a defense under this section, nor shall lack
of consent of the other person be an element of this offense.
(3) Sodomy in the fourth degree is a Class A misdemeanor.6
Under Kentucky law, "[d]eviate sexual intercourse means any act of

sexual gratification involving the sex organs of one (1) person and the
mouth or anus of another."7

This Note argues that section 510.100 is constitutional and that the
Kentucky Supreme Court incorrectly found that the right of happiness and

the right to privacy under the Kentucky Constitution required the statute
to be invalidated. First, this Note addresses the history of proscriptions on
sodomy.8 The focus then shifts to an analysis of the federal constitutional
position on sodomy laws as discussed in Bowers v. Hardwick9 Other

states' treatment of the issue since Bowers is then examined and compared
and contrasted with Kentucky law." Finally, this Note examines
Commonwealth v. Wasson."
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Presently, twenty-four states and the District of Columbia have
statutes cnmmalizmg sodomy. 2 These provisions are in keeping with

'KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 510.100 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1990).
7 Id. § 510.010(1).
'See wfra notes 12-22 and accompanying text.
478 U.S. 186 (1986); see infra notes 23-30 and accompanying text.
,0See wfra notes 31-77 and accompanying text.
"See mfra notes 78-177 and accompanying text.
Private, consensual sodomy is a criminal offense under the following statutes: ALk. CODE §
13A-6-65(aX3) (1982) (class A msdemunor); ARz. Rv. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-1411, -1412 (1989)
(class 3 rmsdemeanor); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-122(b) (Michie 1987) (class A msdemeanor); D.C.
CODE ANN. § 22-3502 (1981) (fine up to $1000, sentence up to ten years); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
800.02 (West 1992); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2 (Micle 1992) (imprisonment from one to twenty
years); IDAHO CODE § 18-6605 (1987) (imprisonment not less than five years); KAN. STAT. ANN. §
21-3505 (1988) (class B nsdemeanor); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:89 (West 1986) ($2000 maxinum
fine, five year maximum sentence); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAw §§ 553-54 (1989) (sentence "not
more than ten years"); MAss ANN. LAws ch. 272 § 34 (Law. Co-op. 1992) (sentence "not more than
twenty years"); MIcH. COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 750.158, .338, .338(a)-(b) (West 1991) (fine up to
$2500, sentence up to five years); MINf.STAT. ANN. § 609.293 (West 1987) (fine up to $3000;
imprisonment up to one year); Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-29-59 (1972) (sentence up to ten yewrs); Mo.
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the states' long history of criminalizing sodomy At the time of the
ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, all but five states in the
Union had criminal sodomy laws, 3 and until 1961, every state outlawed sodomy " Prohibitions against sodomy also have a long history throughout the world. The Bible condemns sodomy in both the Old
and New Testaments.'" Further, homosexual sodomy was a capital
crime under Roman law and was secularly crimmalized during the
English reformation under Henry VIII. 6 Blackstone described sodomy as "the infamous crime against nature," an offense of "deeper

malignity" than rape, a heinous act "the very mention of which is a
disgrace to human nature," and "a crime not fit to be named."' 7 Lord

REv. SrAT. § 566.090 (1991) (class A misdemeanor); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-505 (1991) (fine
up to $50,000, impnsonment up to ten years); NEv. REV. STAT. § 201.190 (1991) (imprisonment for
one to six years); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-177 (1991) (class H felony); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §

886 (West 1983) (imprisonment no more than ten years); L. GEN. LAws § 11-10-1 (1981) (sentence
between seven and twenty years); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-15-120 (Law. Co-op. 1985) (fine up to $500;
sentence up to five years); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-510 (1991) (class C nsdemeanor); Tht
PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.06 (West 1988) (class C misdemeanor); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-403
(1990) (class B misdemeanor); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-361 (Michie 1992) (class B felony).
" See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 192-93 (1986).
"Id.
U Among the pertinent Old Testament passages are: 'o not lie with a man as one ies with a
woman; that is detestable." Leviticus 18'.22 (New International Version); "If a man lies with a man
as one lies with a woman, both of them have done what is detestable. They must be put to death;
their blood will be on their own heads." Leviticus 20:13 (New International Version). New Testament
passages include: "Because of this, God gave them over to shameful lusts. Even their women
exchanged natural relations for unnatural ones. In the same way the men also abandoned natural
relations with women and were inflamed with lust for one another. Men committed indecent acts with
other men, and received in themselves the due penalty for their pervemon." Romans 1.26-27 (New
International Version); "Do you not know that the wicked will not inherit the kingdom of God? Do
not be deceived. Neither the sexually unmoral nor idolaters nor adulterers nor male prostitutes nor
homosexual offenders nor thieves nor the greedy nor drunkards nor slanderers nor swindlers will
inherit the kingdom of God." I Cornns 6:9-10 (New International Version). The cities of Sodom
and Gomorrah were also condemned at least in part because of the prevalence of homosexual
practices. Geness 18:16-19:29 (New International Version).
1"&e Bowers, 478 U.S. at 196-97 (Burger, J., concurring) (citations omitted). The original
English statute readFor as much as there is not yet sufficient and condign punishment appointed and limited
by the due course of the Laws of this realm, for the detestable and abominable vice of
buggeiy committed with mankind or beast .it may therefore please the King's hghness,
with the assent of is lords sapiritual and temporal, and the commons of this present
parliament assembled . that the same offence be from henceforth adjudged felony
And that the offenders being hereof convict
shall suffer such pains of death, and
losses, and penalties of their hoods, chattels, debts, lands, tenements and hereditsment, as
felons be accustomed to do, according to the order of the common laws ofthis realm

And that justices of Peace shall have power and authority, within the limits of their
Commissions and Jurisdiction, to hear and determine the said offence, as they do use to
do in cases of other felomes
25 Hen. 8, c. 6 (1533), quoted in Yao Apaso-Gbotso et- al., Survey on the Constitutional Right to
Privacy in the Context ofHomosesital Activity, 40 U. M" L. REv. 521, 525 n.18 (1986).
" 4 Wni~u~ Bt4crsroNE, Commwri ms *215, quoted i Bowers, 478 U.S. at 196 (Burger,
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Coke, m discussing sodomy and buggery, noted that "ancient authors do conclude, that it deserveth death, ultimum supplicium, though they differ m the
manner of the punishment." He also stated that sodomy was against the
"ordinance of the Creator and order of nature."'" This extensive history led
to the enactment of Kentucky original anti-sodomy statute, which read:
"Whoever shall be convicted of the crime of sodomy or buggery with man
or beast, he shall be confined m the penitentiary not less than two nor more
than five years."' 9 The modem statute, struck down by the court m Wasson,
obviously reflects the Kentucky legislature continuing concern for public
morals and its deference to the traditional and historical abhorrence toward
sodomy.
Although the Kentucky Supreme Court was not compelled to follow the
U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Bowers v. Hardwick" in interpreting the
Kentucky Constitution, Justice White's statement of the issue in Bowen is
certainly pertinent to any state or federal court's analysis of the issue of
homosexual sodomy:
Ths case does not require a judgment on whether laws against sodomy
between consenting adults in general, or between homosexuals in particular,
are wise or desirable. It raises no question about the right or propriety of
state legislative decisions to repeal their laws that cnmmalize homosexual
sodomy, or of state-court decisions invalidating those laws on state
constitutional grounds. The issuejpresentedis whether the US. Constitution
confers affundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy."s
Justice White's framework is equally applicable m analyzing section 510.100
under the Kentucky Constitution. Does the Kentucky Constitution confer a
fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy9 In other words,
does the Kentucky Constitution prevent the legislature from crimmalizing
sodomy 9 '
II.

UNIED STATES CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

Although Bowers dealt with the interpretation of the federal right to
privacy as it pertained to Georgia's law against sodomy,s it should be given
J., concumng).
" EDWARD Com, TirD PART OF THE INSMiYr

oF THE LAWS

OF

ENGLAND 58 (1670)

(emphasis added).
" 1 KY. REV. STAT., cl. 28, art. IV, § 11 (1860) (current version at KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §
510.100 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill
478 U.S. 186 (1986).

1990)).

Id. at 190 (emphasis added).
This Note argues that there is no basis for the Kentucky Supreme Court to invalidate this
specific act of the legislature; whether this legislation is desirable in the legislative arena isirrelevant
to the analysis of its constitutionality.
"See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 195-96.
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great weight by any state court. It was, after all, the federal courts that began
the development of so-called "right to privacy" protections." Bowers has
been widely discussed elsewhere, and an m-depth discussion of the case
is not warranted in this Note. It suffices to say that the U.S. Supreme Court
held that the right to privacy does not extend to homosexual conduct and thus
Georgia's sodomy statute does not violate the U.S. Constitution In
delivering the opinion of the Court, Justice White listed the Court's previous
nght to privacy decisions,27 and stated:
Accepting the decisions m these cases and the above description of them, we
think it evident that none of the rights announced m those cases bears any
resemblance to the claimed constitutional right of homosexuals to engage m
acts of sodomy that is asserted m this case. No connection between family,
marriage, or procreation on the one hand and homosexual activity on the
other has been demonstrated?
Justice White cited historical evidence of the crmnalization of sodomy
and concluded that there was no credible interpretation that would find
sodomy to be either "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" or a part of
"those liberties that are 'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and
tradition."' Justice Burger's concurrence reinforced this theme that
homosexual conduct has been subject to state intervention throughout the
history of Western Civilization.'
Despite the fact thatBowerswas decided on federal grounds, the opinions
of Justices White and Burger are still great resources to consider in analyzing
whether there is a right to engage in homosexual sodomy. The justices'
historical perspective is sound, and their discussion of the right to privacy
provides a clear reminder that the development of that right has been m the
context of traditional familial concerns.
I. OTHER STATES

As mentioned above, twenty-four states and the District of Columbm
outlaw sodomy.3' Cases that have been decided in these states, especially

See, eg., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
See4 g., led Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARv. L. REv. 737 (1989); John IL

Hamilton, Comment, Sodomy Statutes, the Ninth Amendment and the Aftermath of Bowers v.
Hardwick, 76 Ky. U,. 301 (1987-88); Daniel . Langin, Comment, Bowers v. Hardwick. The Right
to Privacy and the Question of Intimate Relations, 72 IowA L. Rev. 1443 (1987); Serena L. Nowell,
Case Note, Consfitutiond Law: State Proscrption of Pnvate Consensual Homosautl
Conduct-Bowers v. Hardwick, 30 How. LI. 551 (1987).
" Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190-91.

Ad. at 190 (citations omitted).
n Id. at 190-91.

" Id. at 191-92 (citations omitted).
mId. at 196 (Burger, J., concurring).

"See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
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those decided since Bowers, can be helpful m discerning the proper
analysis of the purported right to engage in sodomy. In the end, a close
examination of these cases reveals the fhulty reasoning employed by the
Kentucky Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Wasson.' In his majority
opinion, Justice Leibson placed great weight on the trend of states that
have invalidated sodomy statutes, but he ignored many state cases that
have upheld sodomy prohibitions. Furthermore, Leibson ignored the fact
that most of these changes have come about through legislative and not
judicial means. Instead of discussing state cases that have been decided
since Bowers, Justice Leibson's majority opinion cited approvingly People
v. Onofire,33 a New York decision invalidating that state's anti-sodomy
law on federal grounds. Obviously, the precedential value of this case is

suspect m light of Bowers.'
'
In addition, Justice Leibson found "particularly noteworthy"35
3'
Commonwealth v. Bonadio, a Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision
that invalidated Pennsylvania's anti-sodomy law. The Pennsylvania igh
court relied primarily on the "appropriate region of liberty" as defined by
John Stuart Mill. 7 The parameters of this "region" are liberty of
conscience, thought and feeling, the liberty to do as one likes "without
impediment from fellow creatures," ' and the liberty to associate with
others. 9 The court held that this philosophy limits the authority of the
state to circumscribe the sexual activities of an mdividuaL' The court
also relied on the equal protection guarantees of both the U.S. and
Pennsylvania Constitutions in holding that the imposition of different
treatment based on marital status is wholly unrelated to the state's interest
m prohibiting deviate sexual acts.!1
Despite the common heritage the Kentucky Constitution and the
Pennsylvania Constitution share,' it seems odd to rely on an opinion
that purports to analyze the state and federal equal protection guarantees
but m fact simply concludes, without citing a constitutional provision,
3 Furtherthat the state's police powers are defined by John Stuart Mill.'

842 S.W.2d 487 (Ky. 1992).
"415 N.E.2d 937 (N.Y. 1980), cer. denied 451 U.S. 987 (1981).
"The New York Court of Appeals specifically held that the statute
violated both the "right of
privacy" and the right to equal protection of the laws as guaranteed to the plaintiffs by the United
States Constitution. Id. at 938-39.
Wasson, 842 S.W.2d at 498.
"415 A.2d 47 (Pa. 1980).
Id. at 50.

"Id.
11 Id. at

"Id.

51.

"Id.
,See Commonwealth v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487, 498 (Ky. 1992).
See Bonadio, 415 A.2d at 50.
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more, the equal protection analysis of the court in Bonadio relies
primarily on federal grounds and is thus entitled to little weight in the
wake of Bowers." Thus the only state high court decision invalidating
a sodomy statute on state constitutional grounds prior to
Wasson-Bonadio-s itself of marginal value. The following cases are far
more persuasive, and one must wonder why they were so completely
overlooked by the Wasson majority.
One case in particular that the majority chose not to follow might
have provided valuable guidance. The Missouri Supreme Court, in State
V. Wash,41 rejected a constitutional challenge to a statute similar to the
Kentucky sodomy statute. The Wasson majority, however, found the
Walsh opinion unpersuasive because "[n]o state constitutional law issues
were raised in the Walsh case. The Court addressed federal law only and
simply followed m lock step the decision
in Bowers v. Hardwick "'
This is simply not true. In fact, when Justice Leibson quoted from Walsh
that the issue in that case was "'whether the Fourteenth Amendment
to the United States Constitution prohibits the state from proscribing
homosexual conduct, ' ' 47 he conspicuously failed to note that this
statement was the statement of the issue for the federal claim. The
Missouri Supreme Court acknowledged in addition the presence of a state
constitutional challenge, stating that "[flinally, respondent has raised a
challenge
under the Missouri Constitution." 4 Although the
Missouri court declined to rule specifically on the state constitutional
issue, clearly the issue was raised.Moreover, the Missouri court did state
that "whatever justification there may be for a nononigmalist interpretation
of the older United States Constitution, we must believe that our
Constitution of 1945 must be interpreted according to its plain language
and original intent."' Thus, clearly the state constitutional issue was
raised and discussed m Walsh, and the Missouri court's reasoning could
have served as an alternative to the Wasson majority's more inventive
approach toward interpreting Kentucky's constitution. A number of other
cases on which the Kentucky Supreme Court could have relied would
also have led to a different result.'
See supra notes 20-30.
713 S.W.2d 508 (Mo. 1986).
" Wasson, 842 S.W.2d at 498-99.

Id. at 498 (quoting Walsh, 713 S.W.2d at 509).
Walsh, 713 S.W.2d at 513.
"Id. (citation omitted).
lThemajority opimon in Wasson also cites two other cases decided since Bowers, neither of
which is from a state's highest court. See Wasson, 842 S.W.2d at 498 (citing State v. Morales, 826
S.W.2d 201 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992) and Michigan Org. for Human Rights v. Kelly, No. 88-815820
(CZ) (Wayne Co. Cir. CL, July 9, 1990)). As for Morales, the Texas Supreme Court has granted
discretionary review. State v. Morales, 35 Tex. Sup. Ct J. 1117 (Tex. 1992). Kelly, on the other hand,
is the ruling of one local judge; Michigan's anti-sodomy provisions remain on the books and, one
'
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In State v. Poe," a pre-Bowers case, the defendant was convicted
under a North Carolina law forbidding consensual fellatio. Under North
Carolina's anti-sodomy statute: "If any person shall commit the crime
against nature, with mankind or beast, he shall be punished as a Class H
felon."'52 The North Carolina Constitution provides:
The equality and rights of persons.
We hold it to be self-evident that all persons are created equal; that
they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights; that
among these are life, liberty, the enjoyment of the fruits of their own
labor, and pursuit of happiness.53
The defendant m Poe argued that the statute did not apply to heterosexual
conduct, and, alternatively, that the statute was in violation of his
constitutional right to privacy and was unconstitutionally vague. '
The court quickly dismissed the first claim on the ground that the
statute had historically been interpreted to cover heterosexual and
homosexual conduct.55 In discussing the right to privacy, the court
reviewed the federal line of cases and concluded that the right to privacy
did not protect the defendant. The court determined that the law was not
vague, because people of ordinary intelligence know what crimes against
nature are.5 The court made no mention of North Carolina's constitutional right to the pursuit of happiness.
Some may argue that because Poe was decided before Bowers and the
perceived "retreat" of the Supreme Court from protecting individual
rights, the state court overemphasized the federal constatutional protections, thus failing to concentrate on the state constitution. The North
Carolina courts, however, have had the opportunity to apply the statute
since Bowers, and m 1987 stated: "The appellate courts of this state have
'
held repeatedly that G.S. 14-177 is not unconstitutional."57
This holding,
in light of the North Carolina Constitution's "pursuit of happiness"
provision, is particularly relevant to an analysis of Kentucky's sodomy
statute under the Kentucky Constitution.
In Schochet v. State," Maryland's highest court was faced with the
issue of whether a Maryland statute that provided criminal penalties for

would presune, in force, until a higher court rules otherise. See MICH. COMP. LAWS
.338, .338(a)-(b) (1991).
'l 252 S.E.2d 843 (N.C. Ct. App. 1979).
N.C. GEN. SrAT. § 14-177 (1986).

§§

"N.C. CoNsr. art. I, § I (emphasis added).
See Poe, 252 S.E.2d at 844.
See id. at 845.

"Id.
"State v. Woodmw, 354 S.E.2d 259, 264 (N.C. Ct. App. 1987) (citations omitted).
580 A.2d 176 (Md. 1990).

750.158,

WAssoN
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"unnatural or perverted sexual practices" applied to consensual,
noncommercial heterosexual activity in the home.' The court stated: "In
light of the rule that statutes should be construed so as to avoid casting
doubt upon their constitutionality, statutory provisions like § 554 have
elsewhere been interpreted to exclude consensual, noncommercial,
heterosexual activity between adults in private."6 However, the court
did go out of its way to discuss and endorse prior cases that upheld the
statute as applied to homosexual activity.'
In denying a lesbian mother custody of her children, the Arkansas
Court of Appeals, in Thigpen v. Carpenter,"' noted that the mother's
homosexuality could be a factor in the decision to grant custody. Indeed,
a concurring opinion noted that an Arkansas statute imposes criminal
penalties for sodomy and that "[t]he people of tis state have declared,
through legislative action, that sodomy is immoral, unacceptable, and
criminal conduct Tis clear declaration of public policy is certainly one
"j
that a chancellor may note and consider in child custody cases
In a previous decision, the Arkansas Supreme Court stated that "[i]n any
event, we consider the sodomy statute to be a legitimate exercise of the
police power by the General Assembly to promote the public health,
safety, morals, and welfare."'6 As in North Carolina," the Constitution
of Arkansas contains a provision similar to section 1 of Kentucky's Bill
of Rights.67 The Arkansas provision states: "All men are created equally
free and independent, and have certain inherent and inalienable rights,
amongst which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty; of
acquiring and possessing and protecting property and reputation, and of
pursuing their own happiness." '
In In re Opinion of the Justices,69 the New Hampshire House of
Representatives presented a bill to the New Hampshire Supreme Court
that excluded homosexuals from being foster parents, adoptive parents or
day care operators. The House asked the court to decide whether the bill
violated either the U.S. Constitution or the New Hampshire Constitution.
The court first held that homosexuals did not constitute a suspect class
under equal protection analysis." The court then applied a rational level

'

MD. CRIM. LAw CoD ANN.

§ 554 (1989).

"Schochet, 580 A.2d at 177.

, Id. at 184.
,2See td. at 184-85.
730 S.W.2d 510 (Ark. Ct. App. 1987).

concumng).
"Id. at 514 (Cracra% J.,
,Carter v. State, 500 S.W.2d 368, 372 (Ark. 1973), cerL demed, 416 U.S. 905 (1974).
"See N.C. Cowsr. artI, § 1; see also supra notes 51-57 and accompanying text.

"See Ky. CoNsr. § 1.
A

ARK. CoNsr. art. H, § 2 (emphasis added).

"530 A.2d 21 (N.H. 1987).
"Id. at 24.
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scrutiny test and found that the exclusion of homosexuals from being
foster parents or adoptive parents was rationally related to the bill's goals
of providing positive role models and a positive nurturing environment
for children." The court did not uphold the exclusion as to child care,
because it found that the exclusion was not narrowly tailored to the
familial concerns upon which the statute was enacted.' The court did
not fmd any due process violations or right to privacy violations under
either constitution.73 Although this case does not address sodomy m
particular, it does illustrate a state court's analysis of anti-homosexual
legislation and its tolerance of such laws.

There are numerous pre-Bowers state and federal cases upholding
anti-sodomy laws against constitutional attack.' One case that is
particularly noteworthy is State v. Bateman,' in which Arizona statutes
proscribing sodomy and lewd and lascivious behavior were challenged.
The Bateman court stated:
The state may also regulate other sexual misconduct in its rightful
concern for the moral welfare of its people. The right ofprvacy is not
unqualified and absolute and must be considered in the light of
important state interests.
Sodomy has been considered wrong since early times in our
civilization. The lewd and lascivious acts prohibited in this state have
also been traditionally prohibited. The legislature has thus made certain
sexual behavior criminal by its power to regulate the health, morals and
welfare of its people. This type of activity has not been discussed by the
United States Supreme Court. We therefore hold that sexual activity
between two consenting adults in private is not a matter of concern for
the State except insofar as the legislature has acted to properly regulate
the moral welfare of its people, and has specifically prohibited sodomy
and other specified lewd and lascivious acts. While we are very well
aware that some of the acts complained of are not umversally condemned, we are equally cognizant ofour role as the judicial branch of
government and not the legislative.

7Id.
7Id.

"Id.

at 24-25.
at 25.

,See, eg., Carter v. State, 500 S.W.2d 368 (Ark. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 905 (1976);
Conner v. State, 490 S.W.2d 114 (Ark. 1973); Wanzer v. State, 207 S.E.2d 466 (Ga. 1974); State v.
Camnger, 523 P.2d 532 (Id. 1974); State v. McCoy, 337 So. 2d 192 (La. 1976); Cherry v. State, 306
A.2d 634 (Md. 1973); Blake v. State, 124 A.2d 273 (Md. 1956); People v. Coulter, 288 N.W.2d 448
(Mich. Ct. App. 1980); Davis v. State, 367 So. 2d 445 (Miss. 1979); State v. Mays, 329 So. 2d 65
(Miss.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 864 (1976); State v. Elliot, 551 P.2d 1352 (N.IML 1976); Canfield v.
State, 506 P.2d 987 (Okla. Crim. App.), appeal dismissed, 414 U.S. 991 (1973); State v. Santos, 413
A.2d 58 (R.I. 1980); Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975), afr'd,
425 U.S. 901 (1976). But see People v. Onoft, 415 N.E.2d 936 (N.Y. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S.
987 (1981); Commonwealth v. Bonadio, 415 A.2d 47 (Pa. 1980).
"547 P.2d 6 (Ariz.), cert. demed, 429 U.S. 864 (1976).
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Whatever our personal predilections m the area of sex may be, tis
is not the time to voice them, for the public policy of the State m this
76
and other areas of concern is articulated by the legislature.
This lengthy passage is even more noteworthy when analyzed in light of
Arizona's Constitution, which explicitly protects a person's private affairs
from government mtrusion. Article II, section 8 of the Arizona
Constitution states: "No person shall be disturbed in his private afifars,
or Ins home invaded without authority of law."
IV. KENTUCKY CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

A. Constitutional Constuction
There is no explicit mention of a right to privacy in the Kentucky
Constitution, and the Kentucky Supreme Court had not recognized a state
constitutional right of privacy until Wasson, where the court declared that
such a right has always existed.78 Kentucky's prohibitions on homosexual sodomy have been codified for more than 100 years, and yet the
Wasson case is the first to challenge Kentucky Revised Statutes section
510.10079 as violative of the Kentucky Constitution. The only possible
source for a right to engage m homosexual sodomy would be in the Bill
of Rights section of the constitution. The preamble and the pertinent parts
of the Bill of Rights of the Kentucky Constitution provide:
PREAMBLE:
We, the people of the Commonwealth of Kentucky, grateful to
Almighty God for the civil, political, and religious liberties we enjoy,
and mvoking the continuance of these blessings, do ordam and establish
tlus Constitution.
BILL OF RIGHTS:
That the great and essential principles of liberty and free
government may be recognized and established, we declare that:
§ 1. Rights of life, liberty, worship, pursuit of safety and happiness,
free speech, acquiring and protecting property, peaceable assembly,
redress of grievances, bearing arms.-All men are equal, and have
certain inherent and inalienable rights, among which may be reckoned:
First: The right of enjoying and defending their lives and liberties.
Second. The right of worshipping Almighty God according to the
dictates of their consciences.
' Id. at 9-10 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
7'Aa CoNsr. art.
II, § 8.
"See Commonwealth v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487, 491-92, 495 (Ky. 1992).
"Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 510.100 (MichiMobs-Merrill 1990).
KY. CoNsr. pmbl.
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Third The right of seeking and pursuing their safety and happiness.
§ 2. Absolute and arbitrary power demed.-Absolute and arbitrary
power over the lives, liberty and property of freemen exists nowhere in
a republic, not even in the largest majority'
Obviously, deriving from these provisions a right to privacy, let alone a
right to engage m sodomy, reqmres a significant inferential step. It was
m making this step that the Supreme Court of Kentucky failed to apply
the proper rule of construction.
In the past fifty years, there has been a great debate at the federal
level concerning what role original understanding should play in the
interpretation. of the U.S. Constitution and what type of deference should
be accorded to legislative bodies.' The appellate courts of Kentucky
have addressed these issues explicitly and at length. In Shamburger v.
Duncan,3 Kentucky's highest court, constrwng section 246 of the
Kentucky Constitution, stated:
"courts in construing constitutional provisions will look to the history
of the times and the state of existing things to ascertain the intention of
the framers of the Constitution and the people adopting it, and a
practical interpretation will be given to the end that the plainly
manifested purpose of those who created the Constitution, or its
amendments, may be carried out."
This point is reinforced by the case of Games v. O'Connell,s in
which the court stated: "It is a cardinal rule of construction that no part
of the Constitution should be construed so as to defeat its substantial
purpose or the reasonable intent of the people in adopting it."
This rule of construction has not since been abrogated by the
Kentucky Supreme Court. Perhaps the best example of the court's
continued deference to the framers' intentions is found in the recent
landmark case of Legislative Research Commission v. Brown.' The
Brown court based most of its conclusions regarding the separation of
powers clauses on its analysis of the times surrounding the adoption of
the Kentucky Constitution, particularly as evidenced by the debates at the
,1Id. §§ 1, 2.
2 See

generally ROBERT H. Bomg, THE TiFrlNG OF AMEiuC& 133-269 (1990).

"253 S.W.2d 388 (Ky. 1952).
' Id. at 390-91 (emphasis added) (quoting Keck v. Manning, 231 S.W.2d 604, 607 (Ky. 1950)).
204 S.W.2d 425 (Ky. 1947).
" Id. at 427 (citations omitted); see also Runyon v. Smith, 212 S.W.2d 521, 523 (Ky. 1948) ("In
arriving at the proper construction of any specific section we must consider the reason for the
provision and the purpose of a convention in adopting it.").
664 S.W.2d 907 (Ky. 1984).
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Constitutional Convention of 1891.' A cursory reading of Kentucky
decisions that deal with constitutional construction will show recurring
reference to the debates at the convention, as well as a tendency to
explore the context of the times surrounding Kentucky's adoption of its
Constitution.' Tius tendency, for example, has led the court many times
to acknowledge the hostility toward the legislature m 1891 as a backdrop
to particular problems. In the celebrated school reform case, Rose v.
Council For Better Education, Inc.," Chief Justice Stephens, m his
analysis of section 183 of the Kentucky Constitution, ' based much of
his interpretation on the constitutional debates, stating that "[a] brief
sojourn into the Constitutional debates will give some idea-a
contemporaneous view-of the depth of the delegates' intention when
Section 183 was drafted and eventually made its way into the organic law
of this state."
The specific conclusions in Brown and Rose are not particularly
important for the purposes of discussing Kentucky's sodomy law; what
is significant is that the court m those cases interpreted the Kentucky
Constitution by attempting to discern the framers' intent and by looking
at the surrounding circumstances at the tume of the constitution's adoption.
Apparently, as evidenced by its decision in Commonwealth v. Wasson,93
the Kentucky Supreme Court has abrogated this rule of construction and
now has adopted an approach of constitutional construction based simply
on the justices' personal opinions. It is absurd to argue, as the court in
Wasson does, that the framers of the Kentucky Constitution, the ratifiers,
or the people of the state believed that homosexual sodomy was a
fundamental, constitutionally protected right.
In light of two other lines of cases, each addressing the role of the
legislature and its enactments, the original intent approach to constitutional construction purportedly used by the Wasson court should have led
the court to conclude that Kentucky's sodomy statute is constitutional.
The first line of cases is premised on the presumption of constitutionality
of statutes, and the requirement that a clear constitutional mandate
prohibiting a given law be recognized before overturning duly enacted
legislation. In Harrodv. Meigs,' the court explained:
'The general rule, where the constitutionality of legislation is to be
ascertained by the courts, is that any reasonable doubt must be resolved

n Id. at 912.
"See supra notes 83-88, wfra notes 90-94 and accompanymg text.

,790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989).
"KY. CoNsr. § 183.
"Rose, 790 S.W2d at 205.

"842 S.W.2d 487 (Ky. 1992).
"340 S.W.2d 601 (Ky. 1960).
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in favor of the legislative action, and the act sustained And where it is
not clear that the Constitution had been invaded, the courts will rarely,
if ever, interfere to arrest the operation of legislative enactments. A
court must start with the fundamental principle that the statute is
constitutional; and it is not permitted by any decree of ours to nullify
a statute, unless it is clearly against the Constitution."95
The other line of cases stands for the proposition that the legislature,
not the Kentucky Supreme Court, is the commonwealth's policy-making
body. The Kentucky Court of Appeals made this point forcefully in Blue
Cross & Blue Shield of Kentucky v. Baxter,' where it stated:
"The public policy of a state is to be found fist, in the Constitution;
second, in the Acts of the Legislature; and thid, in its Judicial
Decisions.
Where the Constitution is silent, the public policy of the
State is to be determined by the Legislature on subjects which it has
seen fit to speak.
It is only where the Constitution and the Statutes
are silent on the subject that the Courts have an independent right to
declare the public policy."9' 7
Applying the rationale propounded by these courts to Kentucky's sodomy
statute, the constitution is silent on this issue, but the statutes obviously
are not. It follows that the court should have deferred to the legislature's
public policy role and should have found Kentucky Revised Statutes
section 510.10098 constitutional.
The cases cited above show that the Kentucky Supreme Court has
consistently attempted to ascertain the intent of the drafters of the
Kentucky Constitution to determine the meaning of clauses in the
document. Sections 1 and 2 of the constitution are the pertinent
provisions with respect to the sodomy statute. Specifically, section 1
states that individuals have "[tihe right of seeking and pursuing their
safety and happiness." Section 2's denial to the majority of arbitrary
and absolute power over the lives and liberty of "freemen! ' was also

" Harrod v. Meigs, 340 S.W.2d at 606 (emphasis added) (quoting Scott v. McCreary, 147 S.W.

903, 909 (Ky. 1912) (Win, J., dissenting)); see also Barker v. Lannert, 222 S.W.2d 659, 663 (Ky.
1949) (unsuccessful challenge to a land condemnation statute on due process grounds); Reeves v.
Wright & Taylor, 220 S.W.2d 1007, 1009 (Ky. 1949) (unsuccessfil challenge to a statutoy
classification that only allowed a person to quality as "self-insureV" when the person owned more
than twenty-five vehicles; any other person had to acquire insurance).
713 S.W.2d 478 (Ky. Ct. App. 1986).

"Id. at 480 (quoting Kentucky State Fair Board v. Fowler, 221 S.W.2d 435, 439 (Ky. 1949)
(citations omitted)); see also Int'l Brotherhood of Boilermakers v. Holt, 418 S.W.2d 758, 760 (Ky.
1967) (declaring labor contract void as against public policy only because the statute and constitution
are silent on the issue).
"KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 510.100 (Micle(Bobbs-Merill 1990).
"Ky. CoNsr. § i.
100Id. § 2.
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used by the Wasson court as a basis for the right of privacy.' These
two sections, however, should not have led to the invalidation of section
510.100. As the court stated in Shamburger, courts should look to the
"history of the times and the state of existing things" to help ascertain the
meaning of constitutional provisions."° Such an approach would
foreclose the possibility that sections 1 and 2 of the constitution guarantee
a right to engage in homosexual sodomy. In light of the duration of the
statute and the history of hostility in Western law toward homosexual
sodomy, it is ludicrous to conclude that these constitutional provisions
were intended to foreclose the statutory prohibition of homosexual
sodomy. The silence of the Kentucky Constitution with regard to a right
to engage m homosexual sodomy, the two lines of cases recognizing a
presumption of constitutionality with regard to legislative enactments, and
the fact that the legislature is the primary policy-making body, clearly
indicate that Kentucky's sodomy statute is not violative of the Kentucky
Constitution.
B. The Right of Happiness
The framers had no intention, through the use of the word
"happiness" m the constitution,10 3 to grant an absolute right to do any
act.'" The state cases discussed above show that other state courts have
refused to find in similar state constitutional provisions any protection of
the right to engage in sodomy. 5 The consequences of using the right
of happiness as a guarantee of a right to engage in sodomy are
frightening. Under this reasoning, Kentucky Revised Statutes section
530.020,"° which makes it a crime to engage in incest, would also be
unconstitutional. Obviously, the framers no more intended to preclude the

...
Commonwealth v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487, 494 (Ky. 1992).
Shamburger v. Duncan, 253 S.W.2d 388, 390-91 (Ky. 1952) (emphasis added).
"
KY. CoNsr. § I. See supra text accompanying notes 80-81.
See Moore v. Northern Kentucky Independent Food Dealers Ass'n, 149 S.W.2d 755, 756-57
(Ky. 1942). The court stated[A]II of the argument of defendant's counsel clusters around their contention that the
statute under consideration impairs the rights guaranteed to their client by subsections 3
and 5 of section 1 of our Constitution, which is a part of its "Bill of Rights," the first of

which, subsection 3, guarantees to the citizens of the commonwealth "the right of seeking
and pursmng their safety and happiness."
It is admitted that the constitutional
guaranties referred to may-when occasions and conditions require it-be regulated by the
legislature under its police power, but with the qualification that such regulation shall be
based upon some reasonable grounds for the promotion of the interest or welfare of the

general public, but not to be exercised arbitrarily so as to destroy the constitutional rights
so guaranteed.

Id.
Jo See supra notes 31-77 and accompanying text.
'" KY.R V. STAT. ANN. § 530.020 (Miclie/Bobbs-Merrill 1990).
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state's ability to prohibit incest than they intended to create a right to
engage in sodomy. However, if the two participants in an incestuous
relationship were consenting adults, there would be no difference between
their belief that such conduct is essential to happiness and the belief that
homosexual sodomy is essential to the happiness of its participants.
Similar consequences might arise for many other statutory enactments,
such as prohibitions of consensual murder, drug use in the home, and
bestiality. Each of these acts could involve consenting adults who,
theoretically, hurt no person but themselves. These individuals could
argue that it is essential for them to take part in these activities m order
to attam happiness. In the case of drug use, for example, such usage is
assumed to have consequences for others beside the user. However, many
single individuals have the financial resources to support their individual
drug use and could confine their use to the privacy of their individual
homes. If homosexual sodomy cannot be constitutionally restricted, then
much of this behavior surely would be protected as well. These are just
a few examples of the possible ramifications of constitutionally protecting
sodomy. The list of examples could go on and on.
The right of happiness provision must be analyzed in light of the
whole of section 1. Section 1 introduces the parts of the provision by
statmg that there are "certain inherent and inalienable rights
,,,07
Because neither the framers nor Western Civilization generally considered
sodomy to be an inalienable right,"ir the context of section 1 stands
against the assertion that the right of happiness protects homosexual
sodomy. Quite the contrary, sodomy was universally considered a heinous
crime at the time of ratification." ° The language of section 1 instead
refers to a package of rights that are called the "rights of
Englishmen.""' It would be anomalous to conclude that homosexual
sodomy is a basic right when, in fact, it was a capital crime m England
and colonial America.' If section l's "right of happiness" and section
2's prohibition on arbitrary power" afford any type of privacy, it must

KY. CONsr. § 1.
IC,

See supra notes 12-22 and accompanying text.

t See supra notes 12-30 and accompanying text.

, See Ken Gormley & Rhonda G. Hartman, The Kentucky Bill of Rights: A Bicentennial
Celebration, 80 KY. L.J. 1, 5 (1991-92). In referring to the Kentucky Bill of Rights, the authors state:
'These documents protected what were consiuered basic nghts of Englishmen, which existed in

England long before the colonies' independence.
Specifically, an examination of the Kentucky
Bill of Rights of 1792 shows that it may be traced ultimately to the Magna Charta and the English
Bill of Rights." The authors further state: "A central theme of [Edmund] Burke's is that the rights of
Englishmen, reflected in the Petition of Right, Magna Charta and the Declaration of Right, are
derived from tradition and are to be transmitted to posterity." Id. at 5 n.23 (discussing EDMUND
BURKE, REFLECrIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE (J.G.A. Rocock ed., 1987)).
' See supra notes 12-22 and accompanying text.
I2 KY. CoNsr. §§ 1, 2.
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be determined m the context of these core inalienable rights, which must
be discerned from the historical notions of inalienable rights and the
rights of Englishmen.'
The principle of inalienable rights is discussed by Justice Combs in
his concurring opinion, but he cites no cases or other authorities to bolster
his position. Justice Combs states that the majority's opinion is a "historic
monument to freedom, liberty, and equality-the birthright of every citizen
of Kentucky.""' 4 In discussing the right of happiness, Combs concludes
that "[w]here one seeks happiness in private, removed from others
(indeed unknown to others, absent prying), and where the conduct is not
relational to the rights of another, state interference is per se overweening,
arbitrary, and unconstitutional.""' 5 It is hard to take this statement
seriously, and perhaps the best treatment of the court's opinion would be
to ignore it. However, the statement had enough appeal to cause Chief
Justice Stephens to join the opinion, and thus it must be addressed out of
fear that more justices will buy into this philosophy of judicial fiat.
Where does the birthright that Justice Combs speaks of come from?
His source must be the inalienable rights that are mentioned in Kentucky's Bill of Rights. Justice Combs pays lip service to the inalienable
rights, but then goes on to declare that the right of privacy is essential to
natural freedom. This natural freedom must derive from a constitutional
source, but instead of indicating that source, Justice Combs simply begs
the question by concluding that the appropriate inquiry "is not 'Whence
comes the right to privacy?' but rather, 'Whence comes the right to deny
it?""'6 It is obvious that Justice Combs' personal predilections provide
the real source of his opinion.
C. The Right to Pnvacy
The Kentucky Supreme Court has not had many opportunities to
consider the right to privacy outside the context of torts"7 and search
and seizures cases."' The debate has taken place primarily in the

' For an interesting approach to due process analysis at the federal level, see Michael H. v.
Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127 n.6 (1989), where Justice Scalia proposed a new test for substantive
due process under which courts would look at the most specific level of tradition that can be
identified to determine whether a particular right is fundamental. See also Gregory C. Cook, Note,
Footnote 6: Justice Scalia's Attempt to Impose a Rule ofLaw on Substantive Due Process, 14 HAIRv.
.L & Pun. PoL'Y 853 (1991).
...
Commonwealth v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487, 502 (Ky. 1992) (Combs, J.,
concurring).
...
Id. (Combs, J., concurring).
"' Id. at 503 (Combs, J., concurring).
1
ee e.g., Helm v. Commonwealth, 813 S.W.2d 816 (Ky. 1991); Raglin v. Commonwealth,
812 S.W.2d 494 (Ky. 1991); Crecelius v. Commonwealth, 502 S.W.2d 89 (Ky. 1973).
" See, e.g., Brents v. Morgan, 229 S.W. 967 (Ky. 1929); Douglas v. Stokes, 149 S.W. 849 (Ky.
1912); Foster-Milbura Co. v. China, 120 S.W. 364 (Ky. 1909).
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federal courts; however, the court has had several opportunities to discuss
the privacy issue. One year before Roe v. Wade. 9 was decided,
Kentucky's highest court addressed the constitutionality of Kentucky's
pro-life legislation m Sasaka v. Commonwealth.2 In quoting from and
substantially adopting language from Crossen v. Commonwealth,' the
Sasaki court stated:
"It should serve as a reminder to the federal judiciary of the obligation
to exercise judicial restraint in nullifying the will and desires expressed
by a duly enacted statute of long standing on a matter of deep significance to the way of life, attitude of mind and individual personal faith
of the whole people of a sovereign state.
It is an axiom of the judiciary that there exists a presumption m
favor of the constitutionality of a duly enacted statute. The courts, in
deference to legislative bodies, which must be presumed to have acted
within the scope of their powers, will not strike down a statute unless
its violation ofthe Constitution is clear, complete and unequivocal.
By the stronger reason, its constitutionality, and the presumption in
favor of its constitutionality, is supported by more than a half of a
century of unchallenged existence and application."'
There was no indication in Sasaa that the Kentucky statute proscribing abortion rights violated the Kentucky Constitution. In fact, when the
U.S. Supreme Court vacated the case, the Kentucky high court responded
by reluctantly obeying the directive of Roe." In doing so, Justices
Osborne and Reed made their views clear. Justice Osborne stated that
"[i]f the court's decision m Roe v. Wade is a barometer of what is about
to befall we should all turn our heads to heaven for mercy for there is
nothing left."'' Justice Reed found fault with the legal theories of Roe
and stated ins belief that the courts must respect the legislature's role in
policy formulations. He concluded by stating that this deference and
respect for separation of powers would, "[i]n the long run, however,
[prove] to be a far superior course insofar as the happiness andfreedom
of the individual are concerned than the more authoritarian methods
employed in other places m the world and advocated by some for
adoption in tis country."'" This same argument could be made in
i'410 U.S. 113 (1973).
485 S.W.2d 897 (Ky. 1972), vacated, 410 U.S. 951 (1973) (vacated in light of the Roe

decision).

" 344 F. Supp. 587 (E.D. Ky. 1972).

..Sasaki, 485 S.W.2d at 902-04 (emphasis added) (quoting Crossen, 344 F. Supp. at 591-93)
(other citations omitted).
See Sasain v. Commonwealth, 497 S.W.2d 713 (Ky. 1973).
Id. at 714 (Osborne, J., concurring).
Id. at 715 (Reed, J., concurring) (emphasis added).

1992-93]

WASON

support of the constitutionality of Kentucky Revised Statutes section
510.100. 6' If deference is appropriate with respect to a statute that
remained unchallenged for fifty years," 7 then such deference is even
more compelling when addressing section 510.100 and its predecessor
statute,"as which together banned sodomy m Kentucky without challenge for more than 130 years.
It seems odd that the Kentucky Constitution protects homosexual
sodomy while it does not protect the right to have an abortion.'" On
the other hand, the U.S. Constitution's right to privacy protections
guarantee the right to have an abortion but afford no protection for
homosexual sodomy."se Sasa/a is another example of why section l's
right to happiness clause and section 2's prohibition on arbitrary power
are certainly not absolute and do not extend to rights that were not
viewed as rights by the framers. An abortion could be seen as necessary
to one's happiness. However, the court in Sasa/a was never even asked
to rule upon the validity of Kentucky's anti-abortion statute" under the
Kentucky Constitution; the sole challenge to the statute was under the
U.S. Constitution." Nonetheless, Sasaka was neither explained nor
distinguished in the Wasson case.
Kentucky's high court has not mentioned section l's right to
happiness provision often. However, the leading case, and the one on
which the majority in Wasson most heavily relied, is Commonwealth v.
Campbell." In Campbell, the question before the court was whether
the legislature could prohibit the possession of liquor intended solely for
an individual's personal use. The court answered the question quite
plainly m its analysis of the Kentucky Constitution's provisions on liquor.
The court felt that the constitutional sections that dealt with this topic left
the power to regulate the sale of liquor to local options. Based on this
conclusion, the court stated:
We cannot believe that the framers of the Constitution intended to thus
carefully take from the Legislature the power to regulate the sale of

,a,
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 510.100 (Miclue/Bobbs-Merrill 1990).
127 See td. § 436.020 (repealed 1975) (proscribing abortion).
I Ky. REv. STAT., ch. 28, art. IV, § H (1860).

W

"'

See supra notes 119-27 and accompanying text.
See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). The

Kentucky Supreme Court has shown ui Wasson that precedent and the rile of law are things to be
ignored if they do not seem to fit with the individual justices' personal opinions of the law. See also
Thomas P. Lewis, Jural Rights underKentucky's Consfitution: Realities Growuded m Myth, 80 KY.
L.J. 953 (1991-92) (providing an excellent illustration of how the Kentucky Supreme Court has
developed entire areas of law contrary to precedent and contrary to the Kentucky Constitution).
1 See supra note 127.
2 See Sasaki v. Commonwealth, 497 S.W.2d 713 (Ky. 1973).
'

117 S.W. 383 (Ky. 1909).
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liquor, and at the same time leave with that department of the state
government the greater
power of prohibiting the possession or
134
ownership of liquor.
Tus constitutional construction answered the question before the court,
but the court chose to go further
The Bill of Rights, which declares that among the inalienable nghts
possessed by the citizens is that of seeking and pursuing their safety and
happiness, and that the absolute and arbitrary power over the lives,
liberty, and property of freeman exists nowhere in a republic, not even
in the largest majority, would be but an empty sound if the Legislature
could prohibit the citizen the right of owning or drinking liquor, when
in so doing35 he did not offend the laws of decency by being intoxicated
in public.
This statement was cited by the Wasson court as authority for finding a right
to homosexual sodomy in the Kentucky Bill of Rights. However, there is no
support for thins conclusion if the entire opinion m Campbell is analyzed.
Before the court made this statement, it stated that "[t]he history of our state
from its beginnings shows that there was never even the claim of a right on
the part of the Legislature to interfere with the citizen using liquor for his
own comfort."' " This is a key distinction that the majority m Wasson
misses. Drinking and smoking are treasured Kentucky traditions that predate
the anti-liquor laws. In contrast, sodomy is not, and the Kentucky legislature
has claimed the right to prohibit homosexual sodomy since 1860.
The court m Campbell also analyzed the role of natural law m
constitutional analysis. The court stated that "[m]an m Is natural state has a
right to do whatever he chooses and has the power to do.
Therefore the
question of what a man will drink, or eat, or own, provided the rights of
others are not invaded," is one that the individual is to decide.M The
easiest way to distinguish tis case is to emphasize its limited reference to
drinking, eating and owning, but an additional statement from the court
provides further guidance. The court stated: "It is not within the competency
of government to invade the privacy of a citizen's life and to regulate his
conduct in matters in wich he alone is concerned, or to prohibit him any
liberty the exercise of which will not directly injure society." '39 First, the
Kentucky legislature and most of Western Civilization have determined that

Id. at 385.
" Id. (emphasis added).

"1

, Id.

1 KY. REV. STAT., ch. 28, atlIV, § 11 (1860) (cunent veron at KY. REv. STAT. ANN. §
510.100 (MiclefBobbs-Merrill 1990)).
'm Campbell, 117 S.W.at 385.
1Id.
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homosexual sodomy does injure society, for many reasons. 4 Second, the individual does not act alone. These distinctions are obvious.
There is, however, a more compelling distinction.
One cannot have his cake and eat it too. The Campbell opinion
refers to Blackstone's theories on basic rights and natural law.14"'
This "natural law" does not protect actions that Blackstone himself

deemed so heinous they were not fit to be named."4 Man in his
natural state is afforded certain rights. The flaw in this approach,
however, is that no theory of the natural state regards sodomy as

14

Many rationales have been offered throughout history. These range from health reasons to the

role the legislature plays in preserving the integral role of the family. At the core of these rationales
is the need to protect society's basic morals and the sanctity of the family. Marriage plays an integral
role in the family, and gay promscuity does not fit into the traditional family model. Even assuming
that AIDS has generally decreased promiscuity in society, the pre-AIDS statistics are still quite
telling. One study found the incidence of different sexual partners to be at least ten times greater
among homosexual men compared to heterosexual men over a lifetime. MORTON M. HuNT, GAY:
WHAT You SHOULD KNOW ABOur HOMOsExuALrrY 157 (1977). The Missouri Supreme Court has
stated that in addition to health reasons, the General Assembly "could have reasonably concluded that
the general promiscuity characteristic of the homosexual lifestyle made such acts among homosexuals
particularly deserving of regulation, thus rationally distingushing such acts within a heterosexual
context." State v. Walsh, 713 S.W.2d 508, 512-13 (Mo. 1986) (citing ALAN P. BELL & MARTIN S.
WnEBRO, HoMoSrxuALrrmns: A STUDY OF DERSTrrY AMONG MEN AND WOMEN 85 (1978)).
The impact of homosexual behavior on public health is clear. It is well established .that the
majority of AIDS cases in the United States occur among the homosexual population. See,. eg., Sevgt
0. Aral & King K. Holmes, Sexually Transmitted Diseases in the AIDS Era, 264 Sc. AM. 62, 66
(1991) ("Of the sexually transmitted HIV infections, most of those occurring in North America have
been transmitted homosexually to men who practiced receptive anorectal intercourse
"); Marc
J. Sicklick & Arye Rubenstein, A Medical Review of AIDS, 14 HOFmrRA L. REv. 5, 7 n.18 (1985)
(stating that "homosexual and bisexual males and intravenous drug abusers account for 90% of the
reported adult cases!).
AIDS is just the tip of the iceberg. There is a greater prevalence of syphilis and gonorrhea
among homosexual men than among heterosexuals. See Franklin N. Judson, Comparative Prevalence
Rates of Sexually Transmitted Diseases in Heterosexual and Homosexual Men, 112 AM. J. E ImEm.
836, 836 (1980); William F. Owen, Sexually Transmitted Diseases and Traumatic Problems in
Homosexual Men, 92 ANNALs IRN. MED. 805, 805 (1980). Medical evidence also shows that male
homosexual behavior "predisposes not only to the 'traditional' venereal diseases, but to hepatitis A,
hepatitis B, venereal herpes, and some entenc pathogens as well." Janet R. Daling et al., Correlates
ofHomosexual Behavwr and the Incidence ofAnal Cmcer, 247 JAMA 1988, 1988 (1982). See also
Richard R. Babb, Sexually Transmitted Infections in Homosexual Men, 65 POSTGRAD. MED. J. 215,
217 (1979); Lawrence Corey & King K. Holmes, Sexual Transmusn of Hepatitis A in Homosexual
Men, 302 NEw ENG. . MED. 435, 437-38 (1980); William W. Darrow, The Gay Report on Sexually
Transmitted Diseases, 71 AM. J. PuB. HEALTH 1004, 1009 (1981); H. Hunter Handsfield, Sexually
Transmitted Diseases in Homosexual Men, 71 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 989, 989-90 (1981); A.W. Martin
Marno, Jr. & Hugo W.N. Mancim, Anal Eroticsm, 58 SuRo. CLiN. NORTH AM. 513, 514-15 (1978).
Finally, homosexual men are also subject to a high incidence of anal pathology. See Henry L.
Kazal et al., The Gay Bowel Syndrome: Clizcopathologc Correlation in 260 Cases, 6 ANNALS CL1N.
LAB. Sc. 184, 187 (1976); Norman Sohn et al., Social Injunes of the Rectum, 134 AM. . SuRt. 611,
612 (1977). Besides finding that "male homosexuals are at increased risk of anal cancer," Daling et
al., supra, also found that anal pathology consists of "nospecific proctitis, anal tears and fissures,
penrectal abscesses and anal fistulae." Daling, supra, at 1990.
See Campbell, 117 S.W. at 385 (citing I BLACKSrONE, supra note 17, at 123, 124).
142 See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
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"natural." The dictum on natural law in Campbell must not be taken
out of context and selectively quoted. It must be analyzed in its
totality, in the context of the theory it was expounding. Seen this
way, it is unimaginable that homosexual sodomy could find shelter m
natural law In this sense, the theory underlying Campbell refutes
Wasson instead of supporting it.
In another liquor case, Commonwealth v. Smith,' the court
quoted extensively from Campbell and discussed the police power m
general. It explained:
The power of a state to regulate and control the conduct of a
private individual is confined to those cases where his conduct
injuriously affects others. With his faults or weaknesses, which he
keeps to lumself, and which do not operate to the detriment of
others, the state as such has no concern. In other words, the police
power may be called into play when it is reasonably necessary to
protect the public health, or public morals or public safety
When, therefore, the statute purporting to have been enacted to
protect the public health or public morals or public safety has no
real or substantial relation to those objects, or is a palpable invasion
of rights secured by the fundamental law, it is the duty of the court
so to adjudge, and thereby give effect to the Constitution.'"
Thus, the language in Smith itself distinguishes the liquor cases
from the case of homosexual sodomy The legislature has determined
that homosexual sodomy injuriously affects others and is a detriment
to the public morals and health. 45 It also must be noted that the
Kentucky Supreme Court, throughout these liquor cases, placed great
weight on the fact that the individual acted alone. The act of sodomy
is not one of those cases in which the individual is keeping his "faults
or weaknesses .
to himself."'" This factor was ignored by the
majority in Wasson.
Yet another liquor case provides further guidance. In Commonwealth v. Wells,147 the issue was the legality of a law prohibiting the
giving away of liquor. In speaking of the police power and the "inherent power to legislate on any subject affecting the morals of its citizens," the court stated that "[t]his power inherent in the state is not

173 S.W.340 (Ky. 1915).
IU

Id. at 343 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). This justification for the police power under

the preservation of morals has tremendous case support. See, eg., Bosworth v. Lexington, 125

S.W.2d 995, 1000 (Ky. 1939) ("Generally spealong, the courts uphold such regulatory measum if
they are related to health, safety, moras and the general welfare of the community.").
See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 510.100 (MichielBobbs-Merrill 1990).
4 Smith, 173 S.W. at 343.
147244 S.W. 675 (Ky. 1922).
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surrendered or abridged by the mere adoption of a constitutional
provision relating to the subject, unless the terms of the provision
plainly express or imply a limitation or restriction on the power."1"
There is no such term in the present context.
The theme throughout these liquor cases is that the state does
have a right to protect community and societal morals. This right is
not absolute when viewed in the light of the Campbell court's
discourse on natural law that it read into section 1, the court did find
a core value of liberty in the alcohol cases. However, this liberty
value was not found in a vacuum, but was found through tracing the
meaning and consequences of the natural rights that are incorporated
into section 1.
This core value of liberty is not implicated in analyzing
homosexual sodomy. The North Carolina and Arkansas courts
recognized this distinction,'49 and the Kentucky Supreme Court
should not have read more into sections 1 and 2 than the bundle of
rights-the rights of Englishmen."5 Despite these distinctions, it is
this line of cases that the majority contends created the right of
privacy, and the right to engage in homosexual sodomy, now found
in the Kentucky Constitution. But by looking deeper into the
underlying rationale of the liquor cases, it is clear that sodomy is not
analogous.
One final point should be discussed. Although the court in Wasson
purports to examine the framers' intent and the plain language of the
constitution, in reality the court is analyzing the document under some
sort of "living constitution" approach. Many view the constitution as
a "living document" and are not satisfied with an approach that looks
only to the language of the document and the original intent of its
framers. But, if original intent is to be gauged in light of contemporaneous knowledge and understanding, what new and relevant
discourses are there regarding human nature? What new authority is
there? The majority of Kentuckians surely would not agree that
homosexual sodomy is something different from what it was 100 or
1000 years ago. The legislature as recently as 1974 expressed the will
of the people by enacting the present statute. If a fundamental right
has been discovered in the midst of such overwhelming majontarian
opposition, then what is its source? This issue is properly left to the
province of the legislature. The court does have a role in preventing
the legislature from enacting unconstitutional legislation, but in the
final analysis, there is absolutely no support in the Kentucky Constitu-

, Id. at 677.
See supra notes 51-57, 63-68 and accompanying text.
25 See supra note 110.
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tion for the repeal of this law and for the decision of the Kentucky Supreme
Court.
V AN ANALYSIS OF COMMONWEALTH V WASSON

This Note does not engage in a line-by-line analysis of the Wasson
majority's opimon. The dissenting opinions by Justices Lambert and
Wintersheimer are not discussed in depth either, although both justices do an
excellent job of refutmg the majority' conclusions.' However, some of
the more glaring deficiencies in the opinion warrant discussion. Further, this
Note maintains that the court's conclusions regarding equal protection are also
without basis.
The court began its faulty substantive analysis by concluding that, since
Kentucky's highest court declared that the law as it stood in 1909 prohibited
anal but not oral sodomy, any argument that the present anti-sodomy law had
a basis in the law and tradition had no force. 52 Justice Lambert noted in
his dissent that although the majority cited the 1909 case as supportive of its
view, the case actually makes unmistakably clear that the majority is
wrong."

In Commonwealth v. Pondexter," the court did affirm the

dismissal of an indictment against two men charged with oral sodomy, but the
court went out of its way to state:
We must confess that we are unable to see why the act with which appellees
stand charged isnot as much a crime against nature as if done inthe manner
sodomy is usually committed, but as the only authorities we have been able
to discover decide otherwise, we regard it our duty to follow precedent, and
for this reason alone we hold that the circuit court properly held the
indictment bad, and dismissed it. It is to be hoped, however, that the
Legislaturewill by properenactment make such an mnfamous act as that of

which5sappellees confess themselves guilty a felony and punishable as

such.

This statement refutes much of the majority's rationale. Kentucky's
highest court found no constitutional defect with the anti-sodomy law, and,
in fct, urged its extension in the form that section 5 10. 10 0 "s eventually
. Espeally noteworthy are both justices' opinions on the equal protection issue. See
Commonwealth v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487, 507-09, 516-17 (Ky. 1992). Also worth noting is Justice
Wintersheimer's discussion on the msguided adoption of the philosophy of John Stuat Miii as a pat
of the Kentucky Constitution. Id. at 512-13.
"I Id. at 491 ("'Concededly, by virtue of Commonwealth v. Poindexter, 133 Ky. 720, 118 S.W.
943 (1909), in order for the act of sodomy to be committed by one person on another, under
Kentucky law, it is necessary that there be anal penetration.") (quoting United States v. Milby, 400
F.2d 702, 704 (6th Cir. 1968)).
1 See id. at 506-07 (Lambeit, 3., dissenting).
15 118 S.W. 943 (Ky. 1909).
1 Id. at 944 (emphasis added).
t" KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 510.100 (Michie/Bobbs-Mernill 1990).
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took. The clear precedent is that the Kentucky Supreme Court should affirm
the Kentucky legislature since the court, m effect, invited the sodomy
legislation. How could anyone contend that the Kentucky Constitution has
always recognzed a constitutional right of privacy that protects the right of
sodomy 9 Perhaps the most interesting point is that any reliance the majority
places on Commonwealth v. Campbell57 is equally tenuous. Campbell was
decided by the same court only six weeks before Poindexter The majority

placed great reliance on Campbell and its defense of the "right to privacy
against the intrusive police power of the state,""Is but the majority ignored
the fict that this same court had no intention of applying this right outside ofthe context of inalienable rights.'59 Thus, the majority opinion, which relied
on Campbell as a window to the original meaning ofthe constitution, is either

poorly written or disingenuous.
Poindexter, a decision based not on the writings of John Stuart Milff
but instead on sound constitutional interpretation, precludes any attempt to use
the liquor cases as support for a right to homosexual sodomy. In act,
Pozndeaer illustrates exactly what the majority did do in Wasson-simply
discover a right to their own liking that had no basis in the constitution or any
precedents of Kentucky. There is no tradition in "ringing terms" of a right to
privacy under the Kentucky Constitution. "6' In fact, Wasson is the first case
that even acknowledges a state constitutional right to privacy under the

Kentucky Constitution.
The majority also cites the comments that Delegate JA Brents ma.de at
the debates of the constitutional convention as supporting its view of personal
liberty."6 The majority did not explain the context in which Brents stated

117 S.W. 383 (Ky. 1909).
ee Commonwealth v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487, 492 (Ky. 1992).
,See Campbell, 117 S.W. at 386-87.
'"Justice Leibson indicates that John Stuart Mill's beliefs were essentially codified in the
Kentucky Constitution. He bases this on the fact that the Campbell court quoted from Mill, and he
states that based on this opinion, "and on the Comments of the 1891 Convention Delegates, there is
little doubt but that the views of John Stuart Mill, which were then held in high esteem, provided the
philosophical underprnmngs for the reworking and broadening of protection of individual rights that
occurs throughout the 1891 Constitution." Wasson, 842 S.W.2d at 497. It should be noted that Justice
Leibson does not cite to any reference in the debates to John Stuart Mill specifically. Despite tis
fact, he places great weight on Campbell, even though this same court sixweeks later made it clear
that there was no intention to put the gloss on Campbell that Justice Leibson has placed upon it. Id.
at 494-95. It should also be noted that the United States Supreme Court has explicitly rejected the
incorporation of Mill's philosophy into the United States Constitution. See Pans Adult Theatre I v.
Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 68 (1973). Clef Justice Burger cited to many state laws that would violate
Mill's view, noting that the "state statute books are replete with constitutionally unchallenged laws
against prostitution, suicide, voluntary self-mutilation, brutalizmng 'bare fist' prize fights, and duels
although these crimes may only directly involve 'consenting adults."' Id. at 68 n.15. The Kentucky
Supreme Cour, by incorporating Mill into the Kentucky Constitution, may be overruling these types
of laws as well.
Wasson, 842 S.W.2d at 492-93.
Id. at 494.
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that "majorities cannot and ought not to exercise arbitrary power over the
minority."' 63 This context is inportant because Brents had made clear
that he did not view the rights that he spoke of m a vacuum. He stated
that the rights of man "are rights given to man by God, and are inherent
and existed before Government had an existence.'" Certainly, most
would contend that the Judeo-Christian God to which Brents referred had

no intention to give the people the right to engage m sodomy. 6
The above discussion points to the absurdity of the Wasson opinion.
The majority has proclaimed that the right to sodomy, as protected by the

right of privacy under the Kentucky Constitution, has existed since its

ratification.'" The court made no attempt to adopt an explicit "living
constitutionalist" approach. They reached their holding under original
understanding and maintain that this right was protected by the framers
of the Kentucky Constitution." It is hard to believe that anyone would
accept this conclusion as being intellectually honest. There may yet be an
honest and a sincere debate on how constitutions ought to be interpreted,
but in the present case that was not the subject of the debate. The
Kentucky Supreme Court's purported reliance on original understanding
is fatally flawed.
Besides using the liquor cases to create a right of privacy m the
Kentucky Constitution, the Wasson court found that the statute violated
the constitution's guarantees of equal protection." Justice Leibson
began by noting that the Georgia law at issue in Bowers applied to both
heterosexual and homosexual sodomy. 69 Thus, the Equal Protection

Clause was not unplicated. Justice Leibson then cited both a concurring
opinion in a Ninth Circuit case and Laurence Tribe for the proposition
that homosexuals are a separate and identifiable class for Kentucky
constitutional law purposes.'
The oplnon then held "that it is
'arbitrary' for the majority to crimmalize sexual activity solely on the
basis of majoritaran sexual preference, and that it demed 'equal'
treatment under the law when there is no rational basis, as this term is
used and applied in our Kentucky cases."'' The opmon concluded that
there is no rational basis for the statute, because the legislature no longer

I I OFFICIAL REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND DEATEs IN THE 1890 CoNVEMTION 618 (E.
Polk Johnson ed., nod.).
'" Id. at 615. My point is not to evoke a theological debate or discuss the role of religion m the
law. Itis simply to show that any reliance on this portion of the debates by the majority is taking the
statements out of their proper context.
See supra note 15.
'"See Wasson, 842 S.W.2d at 495.
See id. at 492-97.
"' See id.at 499-502.
",Id. at 499.
"'

Id. at 499-500 (citations omitted).

"

Id. at 500.
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crmnializes traditionally unmoral heterosexual activity. This singling out
of homosexuals was held to have no rational relation to the legislature's
objectives."
Justice Lambert's dissent noted the obvious; the sodomy law is not
aimed at homosexuals, but at conduct, and anyone, irrespective of his or
her sexual preference, can violate this statute at a given time." Indeed,
neither gender nor sexual preference is mentioned m the statute. The
statute prevents all people from engaging m this conduct, and therefore
has no implication under equal protection analysis. Justice Lambert noted
that this was the conclusion reached by the Umted States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit m Baker v. Wade. 74 In discussing a
similar Texas statute, the Fifth Circuit stated that "[t]he statute affects
only those who choose to act in the manner proscribed" and is not
directed at a class of people. 75
Even assuming that there is a classification and the statute is subject
to equal protection analysis, Justice Leibson admitted that it is subject
only to rational level scrutiny. 76 This deferential standard was certainly
met, because it is rational for the legislature to distinguish acts of sodomy
between homosexuals and heterosexuals. Justice Lambert was correct m
concluding that the distinction is manifest because of the United States
Supreme Court's own "heightened protection of the right of persons with
respect to conduct m the context of marriage, procreation, contraception,
family relationships, and child rearing and education.""
These
concerns are lessened, if not rendered altogether irrelevant, with regard
to the homosexual, and thus the classification would survive rational basis
scrutiny.
CONCLUSION

The combination of the weight of history, the Bowers decision, other

states' treatment of the subject, and Kentucky constitutional jurisprudence
leads to one conclusion concerning the constitutionality of Kentucky
7 --it is constitutional. The Kentucky
Revised Statutes section 510.100M
Supreme Court's conclusion to the contrary is a wide divergence from
precedent and will have consequences for the state's police power that
will pose a great danger to the state. Justice Osborne's statement in Sasala

InId. at 501-02.
1 Id. at 507-08.
Id. at 508 (citing Baker v. Wade, 774 F.2d 1285 (5th Cir. 1985), cer. dented, 478 U.S. 1022

(1986)).
"

N

Baker, 774 F.2d at 1287.
asson, 842 S.W.2d at 500.

"'Id.at 509 (Lambert J.,
dissenting).
"' Ky. RLv. STAT. ANN. § 510.100 (MichiwBobbs-Merrill 1990).
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v. Commonwealth179 is appropriate m the present context. If the
Kentucky Supreme Court's decision m Wasson "is a barometer of what
is about to befall we should all turn our heads to heaven for mercy for
there is nothing left."'" The Wasson decision makes clear that there is
not much left of the Kentucky Constitution and honest judicial mterpretation m Kentucky. Four men have decided to usurp the rule of law and
have substituted for it their "reasoned judgment" despite overwhelming
evidence against their conclusion. One can only wonder what the reign
of this "rule of men!' has in store.
John C. Roach*

-- 497 S.W.2d 713 (Ky. 1973).
Id. at 714 (Osborne, 3., concurring).
* John C. Roach received his I.D. from the University of Kentucky in 1992 and is currently
serving as a judicial clerk for Judge Pierce Lively of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit.

